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With the issuance of Corporate Governance Code in 2000 in Malaysia, it is expected that 
corporate governance has played an important role ensuring the reliability of financial 
statements. This study seeks to examine the nature financial restatements in Malaysia. It 
also seeks to investigate whether the corporate governance characteristics are associated 
with financial restatement.  
 
Using the restated financial statements during the period of 2002 to 2005 matched with a 
control group of non-restating firms, the results show that the primary reason for 
misstating the accounts is to inflate earnings. The nomination committee of the firms that 
restated is less independent and managerial ownership and the logistic regression analysis 
indicates that the extent of ownership by outside blockholders is able to constrain 
managers from misstating accounts. The results also show that firms with high level of 
debts (an indicator of the presence of debt covenants) are more likely to commit in 
financial misstatement.  
 
The research is significant as it provides evidence on the role of corporate governance, 
especially the ownership by outside blockholders in Malaysia. This shows that outside 
blockholders is effective in disciplining managers so that the accounts so prepared are not 
misleading. 
 
This study does not support the move by Malaysian Government to require companies 
audit committee to be wholly independent.  It is suggested that the more important thing 
is to have audit committee members who understand accounting and the related 
standards.  
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The issue of financial restatements has gained prominence in recent years as 
investors’ losses from high-profile financial restatements 
1
 continue to rise. Restatements, 
especially when frauds are involved, have raised significant concern about the adequacy 
of current corporate governance and financial disclosure oversight (GAO, 2002). The 
pervasive accounting and financial irregularities such as the case of Enron and 
WorldCom in the US have led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and 
the adoption of new corporate governance rules for exchange listed firms by NASDAQ in 
November 2003. The fact that regulators have placed greater emphasis on strengthening 
corporate governance standards in the aftermath of major financial statement frauds 
suggests that regulators views corporate governance rules as an important mechanism in 
deterring financial statement frauds (Persons, 2005).  
Research shows that there is a link between corporate governance practices and 
the incidence of financial restatement (for example, see Effendi, Srivastava and Swanson, 
2004). Coffee (2005), for instance, argues that differences in the structure of ownership 
led to differences in the nature of corporate scandals. Dispersed ownership systems as in 
the US are prone to the forms of earnings management, and the incidents of financial 
restatements are quite rampant (see Huron Consulting Group, 2003 & 2005). However, in 
the European concentrated ownership systems, the incidents of financial statement 
restatements are rare; and while Europe also had financial scandals, most were 
characteristically different from the US style of earnings manipulation. In Europe, the 
controlling shareholders tend to exploit the private benefits of controls through 
misappropriation of assets.  
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  It has been shown by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) that twenty-four percent of 
financial statement restatement cases involve frauds. The US General Accounting Office 
(GAO; renamed Government Accountability Office in 2004) estimated that between 
January 1997 and June 2002, accounting restatements in the US have caused market 
capitalization to lose around US$100 billion. Enron, for example, announced $618 
million loss in its third 2001 quarterly report. A few weeks following this announcement, 
Enron disclosed that it had to restate earnings for the previous several years (Sridharan et 
al., 2002; Low, 2004). The number of restatements in the US also has climbed in the year 
2004 to 414 as compared to 323 the previous year (Huron Consulting Group, 2005). This 
is the highest number of restatements of any of the last seven years (2002: 330 
restatements; 2001: 270; 2000: 233; 1999: 216; 1998: 158) (Huron Consulting Group, 
2003 & 2005).  
 In Malaysia, CSM Corporation Bhd, a listed company, was directed to restate its 
1999 financial statements (Securities Commission, 2002). Recently, the Securities 
Commission (SC) ordered OilCorp Bhd (to restate its 2004 accounts) and Aktif Lifestyle 
(to restate its 2003 and 2002 accounts). Goh Ban Huat was also ordered to reissue its 
2004 fourth quarter report after being found overstating the profits by RM121 million 
(www.sc.com.my). Other listed companies that showed substantial discrepancies between 
unaudited and audited results were SBBS Consortium Bhd, Karensoft Technology Bhd, 
Paxelent Corp Bhd and Lityan Holdings Bhd (Oh, 2005). In Celcom’s case (a subsidiary 
of Telekom Malaysia), the auditor of Celcom Bhd discovered fictitious invoices issued to 
the Group amounting to RM259.32 million (about USD70 million). More recently, in 
2007, misstatement by Transmile Group was discovered in a special audit to have inflated 
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its revenue by RM RM522 million for financial years 2004-2006. Additional RM341 
million and RM189 million of invalid transactions were also discovered during the 
period. As a result, the price of Transmile’s share price declined from RM15 to RM2 per 
share, resulting in a total paper loss, thus far, of RM3.4 billion. These high profile 
financial frauds expose board’s inactivity, lack of expertise or being dominated by 
executive directors (Skousen, Glover and Prawitt, 2005). For instance, in 2000 letter to 
shareholders, the CEO of Enron reported that the company hit a record of USD1.3 billion 
in net income. However, after restatement, the audited net income was only USD978.5 
million. Yet, the board did not detect the discrepancy. Board ineptness might have 
contributed to the misstatement. 
 The objectives of this research are, therefore, as follows. First, we aim to examine 
the extent of financial restatement in Malaysia. Second, we seek to identify the items in 
the financial statements that are commonly restated. Third, we intend to reveal the 
reasons that had led to financial statement restatements. Finally, we are interested to 
investigate whether the board of directors, the audit committee and ownership structure 
are associated with financial restatement. The findings are useful for regulatory bodies 
such as the Bursa Malaysia and SC as well as the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance for policy deliberations. Given the different regulatory and cultural 
environments, our evidence will provide insight as to the extent and causes of financial 
restatement in Malaysia, a developing country. In fact, Eilifsen and Messier (2000) note 
that most studies investigating the nature of misstatements are done in the US and that 
only two studies (Chan and Mo, 1998; Eilifsen, Austen, and Messier 2000) examine non-
Anglo American settings.  
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 Data for this study are obtained from the restated annual reports for the period of 
2002 to 2005 with firm-years being the unit of observation. For regression analysis 
purposes, a control group is formed using the match-pair procedures where restated and 
non-restated firms are matched by size, industry, exchange board classification, and 
financial year end. The findings show that even though the incidence of financial 
restatement, which met the GAO’s definition, is not rampant in Malaysia, but almost 40% 
of restatement relates to costs and expenses. Contrary to many arguments, audit 
committee of the restated firms is found to be more independent than non-restated firms; 
whereas managerial ownership is found to be higher for restated firms. The results also 
suggest that outside blockholders are effective monitoring as they are negatively 
associated with the incident of restatements. The findings contribute to the corporate 
governance literature by suggesting that outside blockholders is effective in disciplining 
managers and hence improve the financial reporting of the firm. This is consistent with 
Yeo et al. (2002) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996). 
 The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Next, literature review on 
financial restatement and corporate governance is presented followed by hypothesis 
development. A section outlining the research methodology is provided in the subsequent 




 Financial restatement is generally viewed as corrections made to the financial 
statements due to non-compliance with the GAAP (Palmrose and Scholz, 2000; 
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2001; Efendi et al. 2004; Myers, Myers and Palmrose, 
2004). The GAO (2002, p. 1) states that “A financial statement restatement occurs when 
a company, either voluntarily or prompted by auditors or regulators, revises public 
financial information that was previously reported.” It includes only those financial 
restatements arising from accounting irregularities but excludes restatements due to 
normal corporate activities or simple presentational issues (refer to Appendix 1 for 
detailed definition). Huron Consulting Group 
2
 (2003) reported three primary causes of 
accounting errors: problems in applying the accounting rules, human and system errors, 
and fraudulent behaviors. In the 2004 study, they found the leading causes of 
restatements, namely revenue recognition, equity accounting, reserves, accruals, and 
contingencies (Huron Consulting Group, 2005). The repercussion of restatements is the 
adverse public confidence in the business community and capital market (GAO, 2002). 
Restatements also have caused concern regarding the quality of financial reporting 
(Levitt, 1998 and Palmrose and Scholz, 2000). 
 Efendi et al. (2004) show the likelihood of a restatement is significantly higher for 
firms that are constrained by debt covenants. Coffee (2005), on the other hand, argues 
that restatements are rare in Europe as contrast to the US, which experienced an 
accelerating incidence of financial statement restatements that began in the late 1990s. 
Coffee argues that a sudden change in executive compensation during the 1990s, from a 
predominantly cash-based system to an equity-based system which has not been 
 6
accompanied by any compensating change in corporate governance has contributed to the 
sudden rise in financial misstatements. Unlike US, Europe experienced lesser accounting 
irregularities than in the US for two reasons. First, they use less equity compensation; and 
secondly, they have lesser interest in the short-term stock price (Coffee, 2005).  
 Restatements have been found to be driven by income-increasing motivation 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991), debt covenant constraints (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Richardson, Tuna and Wu, 2002) and the desire to attract external financing at a low cost 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Richardson et al., 2002). It is also noted that corrections involving 
prior year earnings are less frequent for understatements compared to overstatements of 
earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991). Firms that corrected previously reported 
quarterly earnings are found to be smaller, less profitable, with high debt levels, slower 
growth and facing more serious uncertainties (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989), consistent 
with the findings by Ku-Ismail and Abdullah (2005) who find that companies that defer 
the recognition of the exceptional items, a tool used to manipulate quarterly earnings, to 
the fourth quarter tend to be smaller and less profitable.   
 Large negative market reactions following the announcement of earnings 
restatements have been observed (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Richardson et al., 2002). 
Similar observation was noted in Malaysia where the share price of Transmile Group 
shed by as much as eighty-seven percent following the revelation of financial 
misstatement. It is also noted that firms that have manipulated their earnings experience 
significant increase in cost of capital when the manipulation is made public (Dechow et 
al., 1996). Palmrose et al., (2001) argue that the negative market reaction signals the 
market’s negative perception on management integrity and competence. However, 
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despite the negative publicity from misstatement, it is further noted, restating firms do not 
appear to adopt a more conservative financial reporting strategy following restatement 
(Moore and Pfeiffer, 2004).  
 In public companies, corporate governance is regarded as one of the mechanisms 
that could effectively safeguard the interests of a firm’s shareholders. Agency theory 
views that managers do not always act in the best interests of the shareholders; they have 
incentives to expropriate the firm’s assets, for instance by undertaking projects that 
benefit themselves, at the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This is consistent with moral hazard 
problem. Corporate governance is thus seen an enabler to ensure an effective check and 
balance system so that management acts in accordance with shareholders’ interests. Thus, 
corporate governance acts as a tool to discipline, scrutinize and monitor management. In 
Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, subsequently revised 
in 2007) was implemented in 2000 with the aim of strengthening a firm’s internal 
corporate governance. The MCCG, inter alia, stresses on the need for board 
independence. This is to ensure transparency and accountability of management. Hence, 
the MCCG recommends that independent non-executive directors make up at least one-
third of the board memberships. The MCCG defines independence as being free from the 
influence of management and of the significant shareholders of the firm. In a similar vein, 
Section 166A (3) of the Malaysia Companies Act (1965) stipulates that directors of a 
company need to ensure that the accounts of the company have been made out in 
accordance with the MASB approved accounting standard (known as Financial Reporting 
Standards effective from 1 January, 2006). 
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 MCCG identifies six specific responsibilities of directors, one of which is to review 
the adequacy and the integrity of the company’s internal control systems and 
management information systems, including systems for compliance with applicable 
laws, regulations, rules, directives and guidelines. This responsibility expects directors, 
both independent and executive directors, to be conversant in the firm’s systems, 
including the accounting systems that generate the accounts and financial statements. 
Thus, if the directors fulfill these duties effectively, the likelihood of errors in the 
financial statement is reduced. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a high number of non-
executive directors are better because the more effective the board would be in 
monitoring managerial opportunism.  
 Studies investigating the role of the board of directors generally reveal that its 
independence is an important characteristic of its effectiveness (see for example Kosnik, 
1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). Nevertheless, in Malaysia, extant 
evidence linking board independence, a measure of board monitoring intensity, with 
firm’s performance is not conclusive. For instance, the study by Abdullah (2004) 
demonstrates that non-executive directors do not influence firm’s financial performance. 
In another study, Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004) document evidence of insignificant 
association between board independence and discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings 
management. Mohd-Salleh, Rahmat and Mohd-Iskandar (2004) also document similar 
findings. Thus, it appears to suggest that non-executive directors in Malaysia are not seen 
to be effective in constraining managerial manipulative acts. In fact, findings by Wan-
Hussin et al., (2003) suggest that it is executive directors instead of independent non-
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executive directors’ who influence a firm’s early adoption of the standard on segmental 
reporting. 
 Misstatements or financial restatements, however, unlike earnings management, 
could lead to bad reputation to the independent directors, who are argued to be expert in 
decision controls (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Kosnik (1987 and 1990) also argues and finds 
that independent directors are more ready to use their power during crisis. Weisbach 
(1988) also documents the likelihood of the board to remove CEOs is higher when the 
board is independent of management and when the firm profitability is declining. Beasley 
(1996) shows that the incident of financial frauds is associated negatively with board 
independence. Dechow et al. (1996) document a link between violations in accounting 
that were subjected to SEC accounting enforcement actions and board structure. In 
Malaysia, evidence by Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah (2004) shows that board independence 
is associated with greater voluntary disclosure levels among distressed firms. Thus, the 
evidence seems to confirm the argument by Kosnik (1987 and 1990). Since, financial 
restatements affect adversely the board integrity and the reputation of independent 
directors, it is expected that the extent to which the board is independent is associated 
negatively with the incident of financial restatement. Thus, the maintained hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H1: The extent of the board independence of management is associated negatively with 
the incident of financial restatement. 
 MCCG recommends listed firms to establish nominating committees composed 
wholly of non-executive directors, majority of whom are independent. The nominating 
committee recommends to the board candidates for all directorships taking into account 
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nominees for directorships proposed by the CEO or by any other senior executive or any 
director or shareholder. The committee subsequently recommends to the board directors 
who will fill the seats on the board committees. The nominating committee needs also to 
determine annually the required mix of skills and experience and other core competencies 
which non-executive directors should bring to the board. In addition, the nominating 
committee is expected to assess annually the effectiveness of the board as a whole, the 
board committees and the contribution of each director. Thus, though the role of 
nominating committee has not been examined extensively, Brown and Caylor (2004) find 
that the link between nominating committee independence and firm performance is 
superior to the link between board independence and firm performance, as indicated by 
the correlation coefficients. Therefore, from their evidence, it seems that the 
independence of the nominating committee is more important than board independence. 
The importance of the nominating committee independence is due to the fact it is the 
committee which has the specific roles of nominating nominees for new directors and to 
evaluate the board as well as individual directors’ performance. Thus, the hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: The extent of the independence of the nominating committee is associated negatively 
with financial restatement. 
  The fact that the audit committee is a committee of the board, it is argued, could 
lead to the audit committee to become ineffective as it doesn’t have the power to improve 
the firm’s financial reporting process without the board’s consent. Thus, it is argued audit 
committee independence is important for its effectiveness. This is because the more 
independent the audit committee is, the more likely it is for the audit committee to be 
 11
able to perform its financial reporting oversight more effectively. This is because the 
audit committee is not influenced by management. The independence of the audit 
committee is important because it ensures its objectivity (Kolins, Cangemi and Tomasko, 
1991). Studies have also found greater outside directors’ proportion on a board leads to 
audit committee formation (Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong, 1989; Collier, 1993). Menon 
and Williams (1994) show that the proportion of outside directors on a board is 
associated positively with the frequency of audit committee meetings, indicating that the 
intensity of the audit committee to oversee the financial reporting process is influenced 
by the proportion of outside directors on the committee. Thus, an audit committee that is 
composed solely of outside directors should increase its incentive to oversee the financial 
reporting process and this is reflected by the new requirement by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, which was introduced in December 1999. The new requirement mandates all 
listed companies to maintain audit committees consisting of at least three directors, all of 
whom have no relationship to the company that could impair the exercise of their 
independence from management and the company. In The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 
firms in US are required to maintain an audit committee composed solely of independent 
directors. The MCCG recommends that an audit committee should consist of at least 
three directors and the majority of whom are independent 
3
.  
 Empirical evidence shows that audit committee is associated with better earnings 
quality (Wild, 1994; Klein, 2002). Audit committee independence is also found to be 
associated with fewer incidents of accounting errors, irregularities and illegal acts 
(McMullen, 1993). It has also been shown that audit committee independence is 
associated with a low likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The presence of audit 
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committee is also found to reduce the likelihood of profit overstatements (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1991; Abott, Parker, and Peters, 2004). Abott et al. (2004) find that the 
independence and activity level of the audit committee are associated with a significant 
and negative association with the occurrence of restatement. This is consistent with their 
prediction where firms that conducted more audit meeting and discussion (at least four 
times during the first misstatement year) have lower incidence of restatement. Dechow et 
al. (1996) find earning manipulators are less likely to have an audit committee and the 
majority of earnings manipulations found are originally due to overstatement of revenues. 
 In Malaysia, argument of audit committee independence being associated with 
monitoring effectiveness, as measured by its ability to constraint accrual management, is 
not supported (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Salleh et al., 2004). In a 
subsequent study among distressed firms, Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah (2004) also fail to 
find a relation between audit committee independence and voluntary disclosure. One 
reason for the insignificant role of audit committee in Malaysian studies is due to the fact 
that audit committee formation is mandatory in Malaysia. Maintaining the audit 
committee is thus a matter of complying with the requirements. In the present study, the 
focus of the study is on financial restatement. Because financial restatement could 
adversely affect the reputation of the independent audit committee members especially 
when it involves irregularities and illegal acts, it is predicted that independent audit 
committee members would play their role to avoid these incidences. The hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H3: There is a negative association between audit committee independence and financial 
restatement. 
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     Board leadership refers to the division of powers between the board chairman and the 
CEO. Combining the two roles weakens the firm’s internal corporate governance systems 
where there is a conflict of interest between the monitor (i.e. the board chairman) and the 
implementer of the board’s decisions (i.e. the CEO). Separating these two roles avoid 
resting excessive powers in the hand of the chairman-cum-CEO rendering the board as a 
whole ineffective. This is because combining these two roles provides an opportunity to 
the CEO to pursue his interest rather than the shareholders’ interests (see Jensen, 1993; 
Boyd, 1994). Rechner (1989) suggests that the ideal corporate governance structure is 
one in which the board is composed of a majority of outside directors and a chairman 
who is an outside director and argues that the weakest corporate governance is one where 
the board is dominated by insider directors and the CEO holds the chairmanship of the 
board. In fact, Jensen (1993: 866) argues that “for the board to be effective, it is 
important to separate the CEO and chairman positions”. Dechow et al. (1996) find that 
earning manipulators are more likely to have a company founder as CEO and are more 
likely to have a CEO who also serves as the Chairman of the Board. 
 The separation should provide greater incentives to the non-executive chairman to 
act in the interest of the shareholders rather that than to protect the interest of the CEO. 
MCCG (2001) recommend firms to separate the top two roles. Brown and Caylor (2004) 
provide evidence that shows the separation of chairman and CEO is associated with a 
higher firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, indicating a favorable market view of the 
separation of the board chairman and CEO. Efendi et al. (2004) further reveal that firms 
that restated financial statements had weaker corporate governance whereby CEOs of 
restatement firms more frequently hold the position of board chairmen. Having a non-
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executive chairman ensures that important issues that relate to shareholders’ interests are 
covered adequately in board meetings. If the CEO is also the board chairman, he would 
control and determine the agenda of board meetings and might not disclose important 
information adequately to enable the board to assess the performance of the CEO 
appropriately. The hypothesis is thus as follows: 
H4: Separating the roles of the board chairman and CEO is associated with lower 
likelihood of financial restatement.  
 The pattern of a firm’s ownership signals the firm’s agency costs and the extent of 
monitoring of management. Two issues that are associated with firm’s ownership 
structure is the extent of managerial ownership and large shareholders. Managerial 
ownership mitigates the agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and thus leads to 
higher earnings informativeness (Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that diffused ownership structure creates conflicts between owners and 
managers because managers do not always act in the best interest of shareholders. In a 
diffused ownership firm, agency problems are predictably acute. In Malaysia, firm’s 
shares are heavily concentrated among a few individuals or institutions (La Porta et al., 
1999; Abu-Bakar, 2001). Thus, in Malaysia and in other East Asia countries, the conflict 
is not between owner-manager as agency theory argues to exist, but rather between more 
severely manager (who are also owner) and the other owners. The public therefore 
perceives that the controlling owners report accounting information for their own 
purposes rather than for other shareholders and thus outside shareholders lose confidence 
in the reported earnings (Fan and Wong, 2002). Managerial ownership mitigates agency 
costs, as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Conversely, substantial managerial 
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ownership could lead to management entrenchment (Weston, 1979; Stulz, 1988) and is 
associated with controlling owners holding up minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 
2002). Thus, this could be counter-productive. Hence, mitigating the agency costs is only 
achieved when managers own up to a certain level of shares, beyond which minority 
shareholders are disadvantageous. This is in fact the findings by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
 The extent of managerial ownership is expected to be associated with financial 
restatement because managerial ownership indicates the extent to which managers are 
being truthful to other shareholders. As argued by Fan and Wong (2002), managers who 
own substantial shares have the incentives to hold up other shareholders by not disclosing 
important information. However, the relationship may not be linear. Rather it is 
curvilinear (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Warfield et al., 1995). At 
the lower levels of managerial ownership, managers are expected to be truthful to the 
other shareholders because they are being monitored by other shareholders. Thus, the 
financial statements are expected to free of errors or irregularities. However, when 
managers own substantial shares, they are expected to dominate the firm. They would 
have greater incentives to show to other shareholders that the firm has performed very 
well financially. Thus, these incentives are achieved by inflating revenues and thus 
profits. Thus, accounting errors and irregularities leading to financial restatements are 
expected to be high when managerial ownership is high. Evidence in Singapore, whose 
firm’s ownership patterns resemblance to that of Malaysia, supports a curvilinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management; negative relation 
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when managerial ownership is between 0-25 percent and positive relation when 
ownership is beyond 25 percent (Yeo et al., 2002). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H5:  There is a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and financial 
restatement, negative at lower levels and positive at higher managerial ownership levels. 
 Outside blockholders, who hold substantial shares, play important monitoring roles 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 1997; Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner, 1994; Huddart, 
1993; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). The greater incentives for outside to monitor 
management arise due to the fact that their wealth are tied directly to firms and they have 
the necessary resources to monitor closely their investments. In fact, in the year prior to 
the 1997 financial crisis, about thirty-seven of Malaysian firm shares were held by the 
firm’s largest shareholder (Abdullah, 2002). La Porta et al. (1999) also report that 
blockholdings and institutional shareholdings account, average, fifty-four percent of 
shares in the ten largest firms in Malaysia and forty-nine percent in ten largest firms in 
Singapore compared to twenty percent in ten largest firms in US.  
 Dechow et al. (1996) find earning manipulators are less likely to have outside 
blockholders. The importance of outside blockholders to monitor arises because of the 
influence of these outside blockholders on the share price of the firms and the ability of 
these investors, by virtue of the shares they hold, to determine the decisions made by the 
board. If these outside blockholders decide to sell the firm’s shares in large quantity, the 
firm’s share price will be adversely affected. Further, they are commonly represented on 
the firm’s board and thus are influential in determining the direction of board meetings. 
Therefore, the presence of outside blockholders provides an important monitoring 
mechanism to ensure management acts in the interest of the shareholders. Acting in the 
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shareholder’s interest requires management to provide shareholders with financial 
statements, which are true and fair and free from errors or irregularities. The fact that 
these blockholders including institutional investors, compared to retail investors, are 
expected to be sophisticated and thus are able to determine whether the financial 
statements have been prepared in a manner that would give the firm “true” and “fair” 
view. Furthermore, these outside blockholders have the resources required to monitor the 
firm’s management.  
 However, empirical evidence in Singapore supports the earlier contention where 
outside unrelated blockholders are associated with lower incidence of earnings 
management (Yeo, et al., 2002). Thus, the likelihood of financial restatement is expected 
to be low with presence of outside blockholders due to better monitoring of management. 
The maintained hypothesis is thus: 
H6: The extent of ownership by outside blockholders is negatively associated with 
financial restatement. 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Firms that restated their financial statements in corporate annual reports during 
the period of 2002 to 2005 were first identified. We started with 2002 financial year 
because during this period, the financial crisis was already over and the economy had 
started to recover. Thus, the confounding effect of the crisis is not present in the sample 
because the crisis was declared over in 1999. In so doing, keywords of “restatement”, 
“restate”, “restated”, or “prior year adjustments” were searched in each annual report for 
evidence of restatement. As a result, we found that only thirty-one companies restated 
their annual reports which met the GAO’s definition (refer to Appendix 1 for GAO’s 
definition of restatements).A sample of control group was subsequently formed using the 
match-pair procedures. The control group consists of firms which did not restate their 
accounts, had similar financial year end, classified in the same Bursa Malaysia sectorial 
classification, about the same size as the matched restated firm and listed on the same 
Bursa Malaysia board.  
Table 1 presents the sample selection process. Sample consists of all non-finance 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia on both Main Board and Second Board for the 
year 2002-2005. Finance companies are excluded as they are subject to their own 
industry’s rules and regulations.  
 
   “Insert Table 1 about here” 
  
 The number of firms that restated the annual reports was fairly constant during 
2002-2005 periods, representing less than one percent of the listed firms. Thus, it could 
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be concluded that the incidence is not high. Table 2 reveals the Bursa Malaysia sectorial 
of the restatement companies. 
    “Insert Table 2 about here” 
  
It is noted that almost half of the restatement companies were classified under 
trading and services. Construction firms, on the other hand, made up the least number of 
restatement firms. Table 3 presents the number of incidents of restatements according to 
the GAO’s definition. 
    “Insert Table 3 about here” 
  
 Almost forty percent of the firms restated the costs or expenses. The other thirty-
four percent fell under “other” category. Restatements involving revenue recognition 
accounted for fourteen percent of the total restatements. Table 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables in this study. 
    “Insert Table 4 about here” 
  
 Results in Table 4 indicate that, on average, more than one-third of the board of 
directors of firms in the sample is composed by independent directors, thus complying 
with MCCG requirements. It is also found that the audit committees of the firms that 
restated the accounts are composed wholly of independent directors. The difference in the 
independence of the audit committees of these sub-samples is statistically significant (t = 
2.24, p < 0 .05). Nevertheless, the fact that the audit committees of the firms that restated 
the accounts are more independent than the firms that did not restate the accounts 
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contradicts the prediction that an audit committee that is independent is more effective in 
discharging its duties. As predicted, the nomination committees of the firms that restated 
is less independent that that of the non-restating firms and the difference is statistically 
significant (t = 3.78, p < 0.05). Similarly, fewer restating than non-restating firms employ 
big-4 auditors.  
 Managerial ownership is found be higher for the firms that restated their accounts 
that have no-restatement. One explanation for this finding is that firms that restated the 
accounts are mostly family-owned. Family-owned firms tend to be less transparent 
compared to non-family firms. The percentage of share ownership by outside 
blockholders is significantly higher (t = -2.51, p < 0.05) among firms that do not restate 
the accounts. Results in Table 6 also show that the performance of restating firms is 
significantly lower (t = -1.70, p < 0.05) than the performance of the non-restating firms, 
as indicated by the Z-score 
4
. This evidence suggests that a possible reason for misstating 
the accounts was to inflate earnings. This is consistent with the results in Table 4, where 
eighty-seven percent of the restatement involved misstatement relating to costs or 
expenses (39%), revenue recognition (14%) and other types 
5
 (34%). It is also noted that 
firms that restated their accounts have higher level of gearing ratio compared to the firms 
that did not restate accounts. 
 To test the hypotheses that were developed, logistic regression analysis was 
employed. Auditor independence is one of the control variables. Audit by Big 4 firms 
indicates that the works done by this auditor will produce a high quality job compared to 
non Big 4 firms. It is argued that their audit procedures are more structured and 
systematically organized. Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) propose that larger audit firms 
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have a greater economic interest in ensuring the financial statement is free from material 
errors. Their evidence shows that the relationship between Big 8 (now Big 4) and 
overstatement errors is negatively related. Another control variable is a firm’s probability 
of bankruptcy. Companies that have a financial problem are more likely to manipulate 
earnings, make errors and create losses to the users (Palmrose and Scholz, 2000).  
Altman-Z score is be used to measure a firm’s bankruptcy probability. Abbot et al., 
(2004) also use Altman-Z as an indicator of troubled companies. They predict that weak 
financial position could lead management to restate the financial statement in the 
subsequent financial year. Finally, the third control variable is the firm’s debt level, 
which has been found to be associated with restatement (Dechow et al., 1996; Kinney 
and McDaniel, 1989; Richardson et al., 2002). The debt level indicates the risk and the 
extent of debt covenants imposed on the firm. Thus, there is a higher likelihood of 
misstating the accounts in the presence of high debt level. Results are shown in Table 5. 
In Panel A, the regression model included only the hypothesized variables. In Panel B, 





    “Insert Table 5 about here” 
  
 Results in Panel A of Table 5 show that only H6 is supported. Thus, the extent of 
shares owned by outside blockholders is associated negatively with restatement. The 
evidence thus indicates that the extent of ownership by outside blockholders constraint 
managers from misstating accounts which subsequently require restatement. Hence, 
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outside blockholders are effective in controlling management’s opportunistic behaviors, 
supporting previous evidence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 1997; Admati et al., 1994; 
Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002; Yeo et al., 2002). Audit committee 
independence is significantly (p< 0.05) associated with financial restatement, but not in 
hypothesized direction. However, this finding is consistent with the previous findings in 
Malaysia where audit committee independence has been found to be not associated with 
its effectiveness (Mohd-Salleh et al., 2004; Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Nasir 
and Abdullah, 2004). Two explanations could be given for such a finding. First, the 
formation of the audit committee in Malaysia is mandatory and it is required to be 
composed in majority of independent directors by Bursa Malaysia since 1993. However, 
until 2007, the audit committee chairman is not required to be independent, which may 
impede the effectiveness of the audit committee. Further, it is customary for the 
managing director (or the finance director) of the firm to sit on the audit committee. 
Second, even if the audit committee is composed solely of independent directors, the 
audit committee will not be effective unless the audit committee members are qualified 
who understand the accounting standards.  
 The other four hypotheses are not supported. The directions of the association are as 
predicted, but they are not statistically significant. The ineffectiveness of the 
independence of the board of directors seems to be consistent with previous mixed 
findings on this issue (Wan-Hussin, et al., 2003; Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-
Salleh et al., 2004). Thus, the independence of the board of directors does not mean it 
being expert, diligent, vigilant, or strict as a monitor of management as argued in agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kosnik, 1987 and 1990; Weisbach, 1988; Beasley, 
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1996). Rather, independent directors on the board may serve as provider of service and 
“window to the world” for the firm (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972).  
 Managerial ownership is also not found to have any association with the incident of 
financial restatement. Thus, if this is true, high managerial ownership leads to less 
likelihood of financial restatement, as evidenced in Singapore with regard to voluntary 
disclosure (Yeo et al., 2002). Another variable that does not have a significant association 
with financial restatement is leadership structure. One explanation for this finding could 
be due to the fact that separating the roles of the board chairman and CEO is required by 
the MCCG. Thus, almost all firms, except four firms, separated the roles. 
 Finally, the independence of nominating committee is not related to financial 
restatement. One explanation for the insignificance is due to the fact that nominating 
committee is not very well established in the Malaysian corporate governance framework 
compared to board independence and audit committee independence. Unlike in other 
developed countries such as UK or US, the issue of nominating committee is rarely 
discussed or debated.  
 Panel B of Table 5 reports the logistic regression results with the inclusion of three 
control variables. Results generally remain the same as in Panel A of Table 5, with the 
exception of the gearing ratio. There is a positive and significant association between 
gearing ratio and the probability of financial restatement (p < 0.05). Thus, with the 
presence of debt covenants, firms with high level of debts are more likely to commit in 
financial misstatement. This is consistent with the earlier findings (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Richardson et al., 2002).  
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Table 6 presents results from the logistic regression analyses by adding additional 
three control variables, namely firm’s size, type of auditor’s opinion and board listing on 
Bursa Malaysia. 
    “Insert Table 6 about here” 
  
 Generally, results in all models in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5. In Model 
1, it is found that firm’s size does not have any significant association with the 
probability of financial restatement. In Model 2, the type of auditor’s opinion is 
associated negatively and significantly with the likelihood of financial restatement (p < 
0.05). Thus, if the auditor’s report is other than “unqualified”, there is a higher likelihood 
that financial misstatement has occurred in the accounts, and vice-versa. Finally, in 
Model 3, board listing is associated positively and significantly (p < 0.05)  with the 
incident of financial restatement. However, the evidence suggests that firms that are listed 
on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia are more likely to misstate accounts than firms in 











 Using a sample of thirty-one firms that restate their accounts and a matched control 
group of thirty one non-restated firm years, the findings indicate that ownership by 
outside blockholders is associated with less likelihood of financial misstatement. This 
thus shows that outside blockholders is effective in disciplining managers so that the 
accounts so prepared are not misleading. This finding thus supports the effective 
monitoring by outside blockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 1997; Admati et al., 
1994; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). The evidence is important because the 
ownership pattern in Malaysia, like other East Asian countries, is such that about fifty 
percent of shares are owned by institutional shareholders and blockholders. However, 
other corporate governance variables, namely board independence, nomination 
committee independence, CEO duality and managerial ownership, do not have any 
significant impact on the likelihood of financial restatement.  
 The insignificant influence of board independence supports the previous findings on 
the ineffectiveness of independent directors in constraining management’s actions (Wan-
Hussin et al., 2003; Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Salleh et al., 2004). It could 
be argued therefore that the presence of independent directors on the board is simply to 
fulfill the MCCG’s one-third requirement on the board composition. In fact, it is also 
found that audit committee independence is associated with higher likelihood of financial 
restatement incidence. Based on this evidence, the recent reforms announced by the 
Malaysian Government in the 2008 Budget Speech 
7
 on the requirement for wholly 
independent audit committees may not improve audit committee vigilance and diligence. 
What is more important is to have audit committee members who understand accounting 
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and the related standards. The findings may serve as the input for the board of directors to 
improve their roles especially with regard to supervising the company and to remove the 
functions of directors as a rubber stamp. This is consistent with the new requirement in 
Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 that requires directors to exercise reasonable care, 
skills and diligence at all times. As the incidence of restatement and its magnitude could 
result in negative investors’ perception on the credibility of Malaysian financial 
reporting, it is suggested that the corporate governance conducts need be enhanced. It is 
hoped that the revised version of the MCCG issued by the SC would overcome the 
shortcomings identified in the original version of the Code to ensure an effective 
financial reporting oversight by the various corporate governance players. 
 Future research on this issue could be undertaken. For instance, future research 
could investigate the incidence of restatements in quarterly financial reports. 
Furthermore, other corporate governance variables, such as the frequency of audit 
committee meetings, and the effectiveness of internal control system, can also be tested. 
Studies also can be conducted to see the impacts of restatement announcement on the 
company’s shares price in the Malaysian setting. Finally, a study could be carried out on 
the effect of share options given to employees. ESOSs have been found to be an 
influential factor of financial misstatement in US. The question is whether this finding 







1 Financial restatement refers to correction of earlier misstated information found in the 
previous year’s annual reports. 
2 Huron Consulting Group is an independent provider of financial and operational 
consulting services based in Chicago, USA. Among the area of services provided by 
the Group are litigation, disputes, investigations, regulatory compliance and financial 
distresses (source: www.huronconsultinggroup.com). 
3 In the Malaysia 2008 Budget speech, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announced on 
the requirement for audit committee be composed solely of independent directors, 
effective from 2008. 
4 Z = 1.2 (working capital/total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 
(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets) + 0.6 (market value of equity/book 
value of total liabilities) + 0.999 (sales/total assets). 
5 According to GAO, other types of restatement include restatement due to insufficient 
loan-loss provision, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, improper accounting for bad 
debts, frauds or accounting irregularities. 
6 The GRG and Z-score variables were transformed to reduce the skewness using rank 
transformation by employing the Van der Waerden procedure in SPPS. 
 7 In the 2008 Budget Speech, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announced on the 
formation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the 
requirement for the audit committee comprising solely of independent directors. The 
PCAOB is established under the auspices of the Securities Commission. 
 28




Restatements of acquisitions or mergers that were improperly 
accounted for or not accounted for at all. These include 
instances in which the wrong accounting method was used or 
losses or gains related to the acquisition were understated or 
overstated. This does not include in-process research and 
development or restatements for mergers, acquisitions, and 
discontinued operations when appropriate accounting methods 
were employed. 
Cost or expense 
 
Restatements due to improper cost accounting. This category 
includes instances of improperly recognizing costs or expenses, 
improperly capitalizing expenditures, or any other number of 
mistakes or improprieties that led to misreported costs. It also 
includes restatements due to improper treatment of tax 




Restatements resulting from instances in which improper 
accounting methodologies were used to value in-process 
research and development at the time of an acquisition. 
Other 
 
Any restatement not covered by the listed categories. Cases 
included in this category include restatements due to inadequate 
loan-loss reserves, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, or 
improper accounting for bad loans and restatements due to 
fraud, or accounting irregularities that were left unspecified. 
Reclassification 
 
Restatements due to improperly classified accounting items. 
These include restatements due to improprieties such as debt 




Restatements due to inadequate disclosure or improper 
accounting of revenues, expenses, debts, or assets involving 
transactions or relationships with related parties. This category 





Restatements due to asset impairment, errors relating to 
accounting treatment of investments, timing of asset write-
downs, goodwill, restructuring activity and inventory valuation, 
and inventory quantity issues. 
Revenue recognition 
 
Restatements due to improper revenue accounting. This 
category includes instances in which revenue was improperly 
recognized, questionable revenues were recognized, or any 




Restatements due to improper accounting for derivatives, 
warrants, stock options and other convertible securities. 
Note: We excluded announcements involving stock splits, changes in accounting 
principles, and other financial statement restatements that were not made to correct 
mistakes in the application of accounting standards. 
Source: GAO, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS Trends, Market, Impacts, 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Processes 
ITEM/YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Main Board Companies 562 598 622 646 
Second Board Companies 294 276 278 268 
Total Number of Companies 856 874 900 914 
less Finance Companies 59 50 52 46 
less Trust Companies 3 3 3 0 
less Close-End Fund Companies 1 1 1 2 
less Real Estate Investment Trust 
Companies 0 0 0 6 
less Exchange Traded Funds 0 0 0 1 
Total Number of Listed Companies 
Observed 793 820 844 860 
Number of Restatement Companies  440 560 391 269 
less Restatement Not within GAO’s 
Definition of Restatement  433 554 384 258 
Total Restatement Companies  7 6 7 11 
Percentages from the population 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 1.2% 
 
 
Table 2: Restatements based on Bursa Malaysia sectorial classification 
Industrial classification Number of restatement companies (%) 
Trading and services 14 (45%) 
Consumer products 3 (9.7%) 
Properties 5 (16%) 
Industrial products 7 (23% 
Constructions 2 (6%) 





Table 3: Reasons of restatements  
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
incidents 
Percentages 
Acquisitions and mergers 1 0 0 0 1 2% 
Cost or expense 2 8 2 5 17 39% 
In-process research and 
development 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 3 2 5 5 15 34% 
Reclassification 0 1 0 0 1 2% 
Related party transaction 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Restructuring, assets, or 
inventory 
1 1 0 2 4 9% 
Revenue recognition 0 5 0 1 6 14% 
Securities related 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Number of 
Restatements 
7 17 7 13 44 100% 
Note: The number of incidents (i.e. 44) is different from 31 (in Table 1) because certain 















Table 4: Descriptive statistics (n=62) and T-test results  
Panel A: Continuous variables  
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis T-test 





BDIND 0.43 0.15 0.89 0.45 0.42 0.73 
MGOWN 25.03 23.08 -0.88 29.63% 20.43% 1.59 
OUTBLK 34.70 24.98 -0.71 27.07% 42.33% -2.51* 
Z score 4.75 18.72 53.58 0.77 8.73 -1.70† 
GRG 0.61 0.55 9.919 0.82 0.38 -3.38* 
*   p<0.05; †   p<0.10 
 











NOMIND 52 (84%) 10 (16%) 0.00 0.32 -3.78* 
ACIND 49 (79%) 13 (21%) 0.32 0.10 2.24* 
DUAL 58 (93%) 4 (7%) 0.10 0.03 1.03 
AUDQ 19 (31%) 43 (69%) 0.58 0.81 -1.96† 










Table 5: Logistic regression results 






Constant ? 2.530 2.121 0.233 
BDIND  Negative -1.944 2.810 0.245 
NOMIND Negative -0.004 1.267 0.497 
ACIND Negative 2.503 1.227 0.020* 
DUAL Positive 0.002 0.0.871 0.499 
MGOWN  Negative  -0.038 0.074 0.319 
MGOWN
2
 Positive 0.001 0.001 0.304 
OUTBLK  Negative -0.043 0.023 0.033* 
Overall percentage of correct 
prediction 
80.6%    
Nagelkerke R-square 0.579    
*   p<0.05, two-tail test;  †   p<0.10, two-tail test 
 42
 






Constant ? 1.802 2.507 0.472 
BDIND  Negative -2.119 3.090 0.246 
NOMIND Negative -0.004 1.34 0.499 
ACIND Negative 4.933 2.288 0.016* 
DUAL Positive 0.002 9.698 0.499 
MGOWN  Negative  -0.022 0.033 0.255 
OUTBLK  Positive -0.029 0.026 0.127 
AUDQ Negative -0.092 1.045 0.455 
Z-score  Negative -0.587 0.498 0.123 
GRG Positive 1.680 0.799 0.017* 
Overall percentage of correct 
prediction 
87.1%    
Nagelkerke R-square 0.720    
*   p<0.05, two-tail test; †  p<0.10, two-tail test 
Model: ln (R/1-R) = α0 – β1.BDIND - β2.NOMIND – β3.ACIND + β4.DUAL + 
β5.MGMOWN – β6.OUTBLK – β7.AUDQ - β8.Z + β9.GRG + ε; where R: “1” if 
restatement and “0” no restatement; BDIND: board independence, ratio of independent 
directors to the board size;NOMIND: nomination committee independence, dummy 
variable; “1” if all members are independent directors, and “0” otherwise; ACIND: audit 
committee independence, “1” if all audit committee members are independent, “0” 
otherwise; DUAL: CEO duality, “1” if the posts of board chairman and CEO are 
combined, “0” otherwise; MGOWN: percentage of shares held by executive directors 
(both direct and indirect interests); OUTBLK: percentage of shares held by outside 
investors in excess of two percent (both direct and indirect interests); AUDQ: auditor 
quality, “1” if the auditor is a big-4 auditor, “0” otherwise; Z: Probability of bankruptcy, 













Constant ? -2.580 6.339 2.577 
BDIND  Negative -2.605 0.268 -3.7617 
NOMIND Negative -0.004 0.003 -0.004 
ACIND Negative 5.251* 4.766 5.485* 
DUAL Positive 0.002 0.002 0.002 
MGOWN  Negative  -0.105 -.000 0.001 
OUTBLK  Positive -0.04† -0.059† -0.047† 
AUDQ Negative -0.295 -1.258 -0.741 
Z-score  Negative -.492 -1.623† -1.013* 
GRG Positive 1.592*   
LNASSET
^
 Negative 0.265 -  
AUDOPIN
@
 Negative  -5.136* - 
BRDLIST
ξ
 Negative   2.135† 
Percentage with correct 
prediction 
 87.1% 91.9% 91.9% 
Nagelkerke R-square   0.727 0.875 0.757 
*    p<0.05, two-tail test; †   p<0.10, two-tail test 
^
 LnAsset: log natural of total assets 
@
 AUDOPIN: 1 if “unqualified auditor’s report”; 0 if “otherwise”. 
 
ξ
 BRDLIST: 1 if “Main Board”; 0 if “otherwise”. 
 
 
  
 
 
